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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this study is to examine the effect of board diversity and audit 
committee on audit quality with respect to the influence of a wedge (divergence 
between control rights and cash flow rights) in Turkey. Turkey has made essential 
amendments in the field of external audit in order to enhance the quality of financial 
report and integrate its own capital market with that of EU. An analysis of the 
influence of these changes should be of interest to examine its influence on clients 
demand for high quality audit. This study used the data of 146 firms listed on the 
Borsa Istanbul (BIST) over the period from 2011 to 2015. Using logistic regression 
and Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS), the findings explained that clients’ 
incentives and abilities to demand high audit quality increased because of board 
demographics, cognitive and structural diversity and the audit committee proxies (by 
audit committee size, audit committee independence and audit committee meeting). 
However, the wedge weakened the influence of board diversity and the audit 
committee to demand high audit quality, which will be an unfavourable outcome for 
the minority shareholders. Thus, this study proposes that regulators, particularly the 
Capital Market Board of Turkey (CMBT), should increase law enforcement to 
enhance good corporate governance in Turkey to accommodate the unique features 
of wedge firms and provide a protected environment for investors particularly, the 
minority shareholders. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk meneliti kesan kepelbagaian lembaga pengarah dan 
jawatankuasa audit terhadap kualiti audit dengan pengaruh  baji (perbezaan antara 
hak kawalan dan hak aliran tunai) di Turki. Turki telah membuat pindaan penting 
dalam bidang audit luar untuk meningkatkan kualiti laporan kewangan dan 
menyepadukan pasaran modalnya sendiri dengan EU. Analisis terhadap pengaruh 
perubahan ini penting untuk menilai pengaruh mereka terhadap permintaan 
pelanggan bagi audit yang berkualiti tinggi. Kajian ini menggunakan data daripada 
146 buah syarikat yang tersenarai di Borsa Istanbul (BIST)  dari tahun  2011 hingga 
2015. Dengan menggunakan regresi logistik dan Feasible Generalized Least Square 
(FGLS), kajian ini mendapati bahawa insentif pelanggan dan kebolehan untuk 
menuntut kualiti audit yang baik meningkat disebabkan oleh demografi lembaga, 
kepelbagaian kognitif dan struktur, serta proksi jawatankuasa audit (contohnya, saiz 
jawatankuasa audit, kebebasan jawatankuasa audit, dan  mesyuarat jawatankuasa 
audit). Walau bagaimanapun, baji melemahkan pengaruh perbezaan antara lembaga 
pengarah dan jawatankuasa audit untuk menuntut kualiti audit yang baik, yang akan 
menjadi satu perkara yang tidak menguntungkan kepada pemegang saham minoriti. 
Oleh itu, kajian ini mencadangkan supaya pengawal selia, terutamanya Pasaran 
Lembaga Modal Turki (CMBT) perlu memperkuatkan penguatkuasaan undang-
undang untuk meningkatkan tadbir urus korporat yang baik di Turki bagi 
menampung ciri-ciri unik syarikat baji dan menyediakan persekitaran yang 
dilindungi untuk pelabur terutamanya pemegang saham minoriti. 
  
Kata kunci: kualiti audit, kepelbagian lembaga pengarah, jawatankuasa audit, baji, 
Turki 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Audit quality plays a vital role in capital market as an effective monitoring tool to 
attest of the credibility of accounting information, which improves resource 
allocation and contracting efficiency. The main objective of audit quality is assumed 
to mitigate information asymmetry present between shareholders, outside users and 
management and support users to make decisions. Thus, audit quality has attracted 
much attention globally from the beginning of the twentieth century. Corporate 
collapses and financial scandals also increased the global concern for corporate 
governance and audit quality for instance, WorldCom, Enron, Parmalat, One-Tel, 
Harris Scarfe and HIH (Turel, Genç, Özden, & Taş, 2017). 
 
The quality and accuracy of financial reports are determined by two key factors: an 
independent external audit and effective corporate governance mechanisms 
(Karaibrahimoğlu, 2013). Previous evidence documented that the capital market 
categorise reputable external auditors as an effective external monitoring mechanism 
(Ashbaugh & Warfield, 2003; Fan & Wong, 2005). Li et al. (2014) examine the role 
of the auditor as an external monitoring mechanism to assure more reliable 
information for investors and minimise the agency conflicts. The authors identify 
that the external mechanism has an essential role to enhance corporate governance in 
the Type II Agency Problem environment. The effectiveness of the external 
independent auditor and corporate governance mechanisms also depend on specific 
firm characteristics (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). There are many types of firm 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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